Jon studied intermediate microeconomics with Donald Brown, whom Jon had known Jon studied intermediate microeconomics with Donald Brown, whom Jon had known as a child in New Haven. We were told that this engaging and demanding course was as a child in New Haven. We were told that this engaging and demanding course was a turning point for Jon, persuading him that economics was his true calling. a turning point for Jon, persuading him that economics was his true calling.
After graduating from Stanford in 1994, Jon went on to pursue a Master's After graduating from Stanford in 1994, Jon went on to pursue a Master's degree at Oxford University on a Fulbright scholarship. At Oxford, Jon took his fi rst degree at Oxford University on a Fulbright scholarship. At Oxford, Jon took his fi rst steps into auction theory under the supervision of Paul Klemperer. That early effort steps into auction theory under the supervision of Paul Klemperer. That early effort produced the second of Jon's publications [2] . From Oxford, Jon went on to obtain produced the second of Jon's publications [2] . From Oxford, Jon went on to obtain his Ph.D. from MIT, with Bengt Holmstrom, Glenn Ellison, and Jerry Hausman as his his Ph.D. from MIT, with Bengt Holmstrom, Glenn Ellison, and Jerry Hausman as his thesis advisors. Jon successfully completed his Ph.D. in 1999 after only three years, thesis advisors. Jon successfully completed his Ph.D. in 1999 after only three years, though "successfully" is somewhat of an understatement: four papers he wrote though "successfully" is somewhat of an understatement: four papers he wrote during his time at MIT were later published in the during his time at MIT were later published in the American Economic Review [6] , [6] , Quarterly Journal of Economics [5] , [5] , Journal of Political Economy [3] , and [3] , and RAND Journal of Economics [4] . Not a bad start.
[4]. Not a bad start. After a year with a Cowles Foundation Post-Doctoral Fellowship, Jon accepted After a year with a Cowles Foundation Post-Doctoral Fellowship, Jon accepted a position at Stanford in 2000, where he is now Professor of Economics and departa position at Stanford in 2000, where he is now Professor of Economics and department chair. He was elected as a fellow of the Econometric Society in 2008, and is ment chair. He was elected as a fellow of the Econometric Society in 2008, and is now on the editorial board of fi ve leading journals. now on the editorial board of fi ve leading journals.
Contracts and Organizations
Long-term contractual relationships govern many economic transactions such Long-term contractual relationships govern many economic transactions such as employer and employee, buyer and supplier, lender and borrower, and regulator as employer and employee, buyer and supplier, lender and borrower, and regulator and industry fi rms. What is striking, as Macaulay (1963) observed, is that many fi rms and industry fi rms. What is striking, as Macaulay (1963) observed, is that many fi rms that engage in long-term contracts do not fully specify the contractual terms that that engage in long-term contracts do not fully specify the contractual terms that govern their relationships. Instead, they rely on their ongoing relationships to fi ll govern their relationships. Instead, they rely on their ongoing relationships to fi ll gaps in the contract and to maintain gains from trade. In other words, the parties gaps in the contract and to maintain gains from trade. In other words, the parties realize that the long-term value of their relationship can help direct behavior to be realize that the long-term value of their relationship can help direct behavior to be mutually benefi cial. mutually benefi cial.
The "relational contacts" literature has developed to study the conditions The "relational contacts" literature has developed to study the conditions under which parties can use the threat of foregoing the value of their ongoing under which parties can use the threat of foregoing the value of their ongoing relationship to mitigate the hazards of one party pursuing short-term gains at the relationship to mitigate the hazards of one party pursuing short-term gains at the expense of the other party. In this setting, mutually benefi cial trade is supported by expense of the other party. In this setting, mutually benefi cial trade is supported by self-enforcing contracts that do not require courts to intervene and impose sancself-enforcing contracts that do not require courts to intervene and impose sanctions. Early seminal developments by Telser (1980) , Klein and Leffl er (1981) , and tions. Early seminal developments by Telser (1980) , Klein and Leffl er (1981) , and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) laid the grounds for this prolifi c research agenda. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) laid the grounds for this prolifi c research agenda. However, these and most other papers study specialized contacts that are not necesHowever, these and most other papers study specialized contacts that are not necessarily optimal. Moreover, variations in the information structure available to the sarily optimal. Moreover, variations in the information structure available to the parties will infl uence their ability to form relational contracts, and the literature had parties will infl uence their ability to form relational contracts, and the literature had not offered a consistent framework to address these important issues. not offered a consistent framework to address these important issues.
In [6] , Jon unifi es, generalizes, and extends the literature to study optimal In [6] , Jon unifi es, generalizes, and extends the literature to study optimal contracts with a variety of information structures. To appreciate Jon's contribucontracts with a variety of information structures. To appreciate Jon's contribution, consider an ongoing (infi nite horizon) relationship between an employer tion, consider an ongoing (infi nite horizon) relationship between an employer and employee. The employee's per-period effort determines per-period output, and employee. The employee's per-period effort determines per-period output, which is owned by the employer. A relational contract specifi es, for each period, which is owned by the employer. A relational contract specifi es, for each period, (enforceable) per-period unconditional wages, a discretionary bonus payment (enforceable) per-period unconditional wages, a discretionary bonus payment that the employer promises to pay the employee, and the effort that the employee that the employer promises to pay the employee, and the effort that the employee promises to exert. The earlier literature focused on the case where effort is observed promises to exert. The earlier literature focused on the case where effort is observed and output is determined by effort. Jon's analysis generalizes the investigation to and output is determined by effort. Jon's analysis generalizes the investigation to include two central informational variations: 1) the employee's effort is unobservinclude two central informational variations: 1) the employee's effort is unobservable and output is stochastically determined by the employee's effort; and 2) the able and output is stochastically determined by the employee's effort; and 2) the employee observes some random shock to production costs that is unobserved by employee observes some random shock to production costs that is unobserved by the employer and the employee chooses how much to produce. The fi rst involves the employer and the employee chooses how much to produce. The fi rst involves the application of relational contract analysis to a dynamic version of Holmstrom's the application of relational contract analysis to a dynamic version of Holmstrom's (1979) static "hidden action" problem, while the second involves the application of (1979) static "hidden action" problem, while the second involves the application of relational contract analysis to a dynamic version of Mirrlees' (1971) static "hidden relational contract analysis to a dynamic version of Mirrlees' (1971) static "hidden information" problem. information" problem.
Jon's analysis provides three key insights. First, when searching for the best Jon's analysis provides three key insights. First, when searching for the best (optimal) relational contract that the parties can achieve, it suffi ces to restrict atten-(optimal) relational contract that the parties can achieve, it suffi ces to restrict attention to "stationary contracts" where in every period the contract is essentially the tion to "stationary contracts" where in every period the contract is essentially the same. This striking result arises because unlike standard repeated games where same. This striking result arises because unlike standard repeated games where players rely on "continuation payoffs" (promises of future payments) to provide players rely on "continuation payoffs" (promises of future payments) to provide incentives, in this setting the parties have incentives, in this setting the parties have two instruments to provide incentives: instruments to provide incentives: bonus payments made today and promised continuation payoffs from future bonus payments made today and promised continuation payoffs from future surplus. As Jon shows, these instruments are perfect substitutes with risk-neutral surplus. As Jon shows, these instruments are perfect substitutes with risk-neutral parties. Hence, any contract in which the employer provides incentives using variaparties. Hence, any contract in which the employer provides incentives using variation in continuation payoffs can be replaced using variation in bonus payments tion in continuation payoffs can be replaced using variation in bonus payments that provide the same incentives. Second, Jon shows that there is a "dynamic that provide the same incentives. Second, Jon shows that there is a "dynamic enforcement" constraint that characterizes the optimal stationary contract: namely, enforcement" constraint that characterizes the optimal stationary contract: namely, discretionary bonus payments can be neither too small (otherwise the employee discretionary bonus payments can be neither too small (otherwise the employee will leave the relationship) nor too large (otherwise the employer will renege and will leave the relationship) nor too large (otherwise the employer will renege and terminate the relationship). This limits what the parties can enforce in lieu of terminate the relationship). This limits what the parties can enforce in lieu of court-enforced contracts that have no such limits. Last but not least, Jon also estabcourt-enforced contracts that have no such limits. Last but not least, Jon also establishes important connections between the relational contracts framework and the lishes important connections between the relational contracts framework and the well-established one-shot contracts frameworks of Mirrlees (1971) and Holmstrom well-established one-shot contracts frameworks of Mirrlees (1971) and Holmstrom (1979) . This paper is Jon's most cited piece, and it has become the standard refer-(1979). This paper is Jon's most cited piece, and it has become the standard reference and workhorse model for this growing literature. ence and workhorse model for this growing literature.
In [5] , Jon applies his framework of relational contracts to address an imporIn [5], Jon applies his framework of relational contracts to address an important practical concern of fi rms: the design of workforce compensation schemes tant practical concern of fi rms: the design of workforce compensation schemes and incentives contracts. He opens the paper with some classic questions: "Why and incentives contracts. He opens the paper with some classic questions: "Why do fi rms hesitate to cut pay or lay off workers in economic downturns? Why do do fi rms hesitate to cut pay or lay off workers in economic downturns? Why do some fi rms promote the idea of lifelong employee commitment, while others some fi rms promote the idea of lifelong employee commitment, while others explicitly back away from such policies or hire temporary workers with low tenure explicitly back away from such policies or hire temporary workers with low tenure expectations?" Jon refers to studies and cases that suggest that many fi rms have expectations?" Jon refers to studies and cases that suggest that many fi rms have encountered severe problems, or believe they would encounter problems, if they encountered severe problems, or believe they would encounter problems, if they would change employees' benefi t packages, or if they deviate from expected wage would change employees' benefi t packages, or if they deviate from expected wage increases or perhaps even attempt to lower wages. Jon approaches the problem as increases or perhaps even attempt to lower wages. Jon approaches the problem as one in which fi rms form contractual relationships with their workforce as a whole, one in which fi rms form contractual relationships with their workforce as a whole, rather than have a collection of individual contractual relationships. Jon compares rather than have a collection of individual contractual relationships. Jon compares a fi rm's commitments to its workforce as a whole, which he refers to as "multilata fi rm's commitments to its workforce as a whole, which he refers to as "multilateral relational contracting," with commitments to individuals or smaller groups of eral relational contracting," with commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees, called "bilateral relational contracts." Using this approach, Jon reveals employees, called "bilateral relational contracts." Using this approach, Jon reveals an important tradeoff. Multilateral contracting improves the fi rm's ability to offer an important tradeoff. Multilateral contracting improves the fi rm's ability to offer implicit self-enforcing commitments, which in turn improves incentives. However, implicit self-enforcing commitments, which in turn improves incentives. However, when these implicit commitments cover the whole workforce, it becomes diffi cult when these implicit commitments cover the whole workforce, it becomes diffi cult to adjust to changes in the business environment. In contrast, bilateral contracts to adjust to changes in the business environment. In contrast, bilateral contracts facilitate workforce changes, at the cost of restricting the set of self-enforcing facilitate workforce changes, at the cost of restricting the set of self-enforcing contracts and hence reducing incentives. Jon's analysis sheds light on the use of contracts and hence reducing incentives. Jon's analysis sheds light on the use of relative performance evaluation and the adoption of multitiered workforces, relative performance evaluation and the adoption of multitiered workforces, in which different well-defi ned groups are employed using distinct relational in which different well-defi ned groups are employed using distinct relational contracts. This paper showcases one of Jon's trademarks: begin with an interesting contracts. This paper showcases one of Jon's trademarks: begin with an interesting and important real-world question, offer a rigorous and elegant model to shed light and important real-world question, offer a rigorous and elegant model to shed light on the question, and then use the model's insights to improve our understanding of on the question, and then use the model's insights to improve our understanding of the economic reasons for actual practices. the economic reasons for actual practices.
In addition to the choice of explicit and implicit contracts, a fi rm's choice In addition to the choice of explicit and implicit contracts, a fi rm's choice of organizational form will also infl uence the incentives and productivity of its of organizational form will also infl uence the incentives and productivity of its employees. The corporate form of organization dominates some industries, such employees. The corporate form of organization dominates some industries, such as manufacturing, technology, and many service industries, while partnerships as manufacturing, technology, and many service industries, while partnerships have been prominent in human capital-intensive professional services such as law, have been prominent in human capital-intensive professional services such as law, accounting, investment banking, management consulting, advertising, and mediaccounting, investment banking, management consulting, advertising, and medicine. Why do these patterns persist, and what can explain them? In [8], Jon and cine. Why do these patterns persist, and what can explain them? In [8] , Jon and Steve Tadelis take the defi ning feature of a partnership to be the redistribution of Steve Tadelis take the defi ning feature of a partnership to be the redistribution of profi ts among its partners, whereas with corporations, employees earn wages and profi ts among its partners, whereas with corporations, employees earn wages and owners are the residual claimants of profi ts. They show that profi t-sharing leads owners are the residual claimants of profi ts. They show that profi t-sharing leads individuals to be particularly selective as to whom they take on as partners, resulting individuals to be particularly selective as to whom they take on as partners, resulting in a higher quality of service than that of a corporation. The intuition is straightin a higher quality of service than that of a corporation. The intuition is straightforward: if a group commits to split its output, then it will not take on an additional forward: if a group commits to split its output, then it will not take on an additional partner if the marginal output of that individual is less than the current average partner if the marginal output of that individual is less than the current average output. In contrast, a corporation will hire an employee as long as the marginal output. In contrast, a corporation will hire an employee as long as the marginal output of that employee exceeds the market wage. As a result, if clients are disadvanoutput of that employee exceeds the market wage. As a result, if clients are disadvantaged in assessing service quality, then partnerships tend to be a preferable mode taged in assessing service quality, then partnerships tend to be a preferable mode of organization relative to a profi t-maximizing corporation because they create an of organization relative to a profi t-maximizing corporation because they create an internal incentive to select high-quality agents. Thus, partnerships will emerge when internal incentive to select high-quality agents. Thus, partnerships will emerge when two features are prominent: 1) human capital is responsible for product quality; two features are prominent: 1) human capital is responsible for product quality; and 2) clients are at a disadvantage relative to fi rms in assessing the ability of the and 2) clients are at a disadvantage relative to fi rms in assessing the ability of the fi rm's workforce. These two conditions are typical of professional services, but not fi rm's workforce. These two conditions are typical of professional services, but not of manufacturing or technology industries where partnerships are quite unusual, of manufacturing or technology industries where partnerships are quite unusual, thus explaining the patterns that motivated the research question. thus explaining the patterns that motivated the research question.
In another joint paper [15] , Jon and Steve consider the fundamental question In another joint paper [15] , Jon and Steve consider the fundamental question in the economics of organization as posed by Coase (1937) : When should a fi rm in the economics of organization as posed by Coase (1937) : When should a fi rm choose to do part of the production process within the fi rm, and when should it buy choose to do part of the production process within the fi rm, and when should it buy inputs from the market? Their paper offers a model that combines standard agency inputs from the market? Their paper offers a model that combines standard agency theory with transaction cost economics in the spirit of Williamson (1985) , in which theory with transaction cost economics in the spirit of Williamson (1985) , in which some processes are more complex and harder to contract for than others. The some processes are more complex and harder to contract for than others. The model highlights the make-or-buy trade-off along two dimensions. The choice to buy model highlights the make-or-buy trade-off along two dimensions. The choice to buy ensures productive effi ciency, which is obtained by contracting with high-powered ensures productive effi ciency, which is obtained by contracting with high-powered incentives, yet the organization must bear the costs of contract administration. The incentives, yet the organization must bear the costs of contract administration. The choice to make rather than buy unloads the burdens of administering contracts, but choice to make rather than buy unloads the burdens of administering contracts, but involves low-powered incentives that reduce productive effi ciency. The application involves low-powered incentives that reduce productive effi ciency. The application of their approach is less conventional in the organizational economics literature of their approach is less conventional in the organizational economics literature because it considers local governments as the "fi rms" with the choice of whether to because it considers local governments as the "fi rms" with the choice of whether to provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. The empirical analysis suggests that economic effi ciency concerns sector providers. The empirical analysis suggests that economic effi ciency concerns seem to play an important role in the decisions of local governments to contract for seem to play an important role in the decisions of local governments to contract for services, but not surprisingly, politics plays a role too. services, but not surprisingly, politics plays a role too.
Market Design
Market design scholars study how market rules and institutions affect outcomes, Market design scholars study how market rules and institutions affect outcomes, such as the effi cient allocation of resources or the profi ts of the market designer. such as the effi cient allocation of resources or the profi ts of the market designer. There are two central applications of market design: auction markets, and the There are two central applications of market design: auction markets, and the design and engineering of matching markets. Matching markets describe situations design and engineering of matching markets. Matching markets describe situations in which one side of the market must be matched with another side, but for instiin which one side of the market must be matched with another side, but for institutional reasons prices are not allowed to play a defi ning role. Jon has been active tutional reasons prices are not allowed to play a defi ning role. Jon has been active in both areas, integrating economic theory, novel empirical methods, and data to in both areas, integrating economic theory, novel empirical methods, and data to obtain interesting new insights. obtain interesting new insights.
As mentioned earlier, Jon's interest in auctions dates back to his Master's thesis As mentioned earlier, Jon's interest in auctions dates back to his Master's thesis at Oxford University where he studied under the supervision of Paul Klemperer. In at Oxford University where he studied under the supervision of Paul Klemperer. In [2] , Jon considers the optimal selling mechanism for complementary items, and he [2], Jon considers the optimal selling mechanism for complementary items, and he outlines conditions for which the bundling of items in a standard auction is optimal, outlines conditions for which the bundling of items in a standard auction is optimal, yet shows that in general bundling the items does not maximize revenue. Thus, a yet shows that in general bundling the items does not maximize revenue. Thus, a tension can arise between effi cient allocation of items across buyers and the seller's tension can arise between effi cient allocation of items across buyers and the seller's profi t-maximization objective. profi t-maximization objective.
Jon continued his work on market design as a student at MIT, where he and Jon continued his work on market design as a student at MIT, where he and Susan Athey (who taught there at the time) started a prolifi c partnership. They Susan Athey (who taught there at the time) started a prolifi c partnership. They studied competitive bidding for federally owned timber, with the goal of understudied competitive bidding for federally owned timber, with the goal of understanding how different auction rules used by the government have affected standing how different auction rules used by the government have affected competition. These papers combine rigorous theory and sophisticated estimation competition. These papers combine rigorous theory and sophisticated estimation techniques to shed light on important government policy decisions. It was also one techniques to shed light on important government policy decisions. It was also one of the fi rst empirical studies to focus on auctions with "scoring rules," which are of the fi rst empirical studies to focus on auctions with "scoring rules," which are common in government procurement decisions. In [3], Jon and Susan investigate common in government procurement decisions. In [3], Jon and Susan investigate how fi rms can strategically exploit the scoring rule often used in Forest Service how fi rms can strategically exploit the scoring rule often used in Forest Service auctions. In these auctions, government agencies offer for sale tracts of forest where auctions. In these auctions, government agencies offer for sale tracts of forest where more than one kind of timber grows. The government agency fi rst publishes its more than one kind of timber grows. The government agency fi rst publishes its own estimate of how many trees of each type are present in the tract that is up for own estimate of how many trees of each type are present in the tract that is up for bidding. Bidding fi rms can then form their own estimates, after which each fi rm bidding. Bidding fi rms can then form their own estimates, after which each fi rm lists a price per type of tree, which constitutes the fi rm's bid. The highest bidder lists a price per type of tree, which constitutes the fi rm's bid. The highest bidder is the fi rm for which the simple product of bid-prices and government-estimated is the fi rm for which the simple product of bid-prices and government-estimated quantities is the highest. The paper highlights the fact that fi rms can strategically quantities is the highest. The paper highlights the fact that fi rms can strategically skew their bids without affecting their total price, by raising bids on types of trees for skew their bids without affecting their total price, by raising bids on types of trees for which the government overestimated quantities while lowering prices on those that which the government overestimated quantities while lowering prices on those that were underestimated. were underestimated.
1 1 By developing an equilibrium model of scoring auctions, By developing an equilibrium model of scoring auctions, Jon and Susan use a combination of bidding behavior and performance data after Jon and Susan use a combination of bidding behavior and performance data after the auction to document strategically skewed bidding by participating fi rms. The the auction to document strategically skewed bidding by participating fi rms. The paper highlights the consequences of skewed bidding for both the allocation of paper highlights the consequences of skewed bidding for both the allocation of tracts across fi rms and the resulting revenues to the government. tracts across fi rms and the resulting revenues to the government.
In [17] , Jon, Susan, and their student Enrique Seira study the relative perforIn [17], Jon, Susan, and their student Enrique Seira study the relative performance of oral and sealed bid auctions, again using Forest Service auctions. The mance of oral and sealed bid auctions, again using Forest Service auctions. The most famous result in auction theory, the "revenue equivalence theorem," states most famous result in auction theory, the "revenue equivalence theorem," states that under certain specifi c conditions, there should be no difference between these that under certain specifi c conditions, there should be no difference between these auction designs in terms of revenue, allocation, or entry. When these specifi c condiauction designs in terms of revenue, allocation, or entry. When these specifi c conditions fail, however, then different auction formats will result in different outcomes, tions fail, however, then different auction formats will result in different outcomes, affecting competition, revenues, and whether resources are allocated effi ciently. affecting competition, revenues, and whether resources are allocated effi ciently. The paper uses data on timber auctions in the Montana-Idaho border area, in which The paper uses data on timber auctions in the Montana-Idaho border area, in which both oral and sealed bid auctions have been used. An advantage of the setting is that both oral and sealed bid auctions have been used. An advantage of the setting is that the choice of auction format was driven by exogenous factors and occasionally by the choice of auction format was driven by exogenous factors and occasionally by explicit randomization. The paper shows that, consistent with some recent developexplicit randomization. The paper shows that, consistent with some recent development in auction theory, sealed-bid auctions favor "weak" participants (those with a ment in auction theory, sealed-bid auctions favor "weak" participants (those with a lower expected value from the auctioned object) and that prices in these auctions lower expected value from the auctioned object) and that prices in these auctions are higher than those in oral auctions. The analysis suggests that a lack of aggressive are higher than those in oral auctions. The analysis suggests that a lack of aggressive competition among the few large bidders could explain the departures from more competition among the few large bidders could explain the departures from more competitive bidding in oral auctions. In addition to its applied contribution to the competitive bidding in oral auctions. In addition to its applied contribution to the design of timber auctions, the paper brings together an impressive collection of design of timber auctions, the paper brings together an impressive collection of methods that are needed to capture the deviations of timber auctions from the methods that are needed to capture the deviations of timber auctions from the standard textbook auction setting, such as bidder asymmetries, unobserved heterostandard textbook auction setting, such as bidder asymmetries, unobserved heterogeneity, and a joint decision of bidding and participation. geneity, and a joint decision of bidding and participation.
In a follow-up paper [23], Jon, Susan, and their student Dominic Coey use an In a follow-up paper [23], Jon, Susan, and their student Dominic Coey use an empirical approach similar to the one used in [17] to study alternative methods empirical approach similar to the one used in [17] to study alternative methods 1 For example, imagine that the government estimates 500 Douglas fi r trees (D) and 400 Western Hemlock trees (W ). Imagine that Firm 1 bids $90 for each D tree and $80 for each W tree, while Firm 2 bids $80 and $100. The government uses its estimates, together with the fi rms' bids, to create a total bid per fi rm. The total bid of Firm 1 is then ($90 × 500) + ($80 × 400) = $77,000 while the total bid of Firm 2 is ($80 × 500) + ($100 × 400) = $80,000, and Firm 2 is the winning bidder. Now, imagine that Firm 2 sends a surveyor to count the trees and as a result estimates that there are in fact 600 D trees and only 300 W trees. Instead of bidding $80 and $100 for the trees, it can change its bids to $40 and $150, respectively. Its total bid is still $80,000, so it will win the auction, but if its estimates were correct then Firm 2 would only end up paying ($40 × 600) + ($150 × 300) = $69,000, compared to paying ($80 × 600) + ($100 × 300) = $78,000 if it kept the original bids of $80 and $100 (which resulted in the same total bid). In equilibrium, both fi rms have an incentive to produce accurate estimates and to use these strategically.
for a government to achieve distributional goals in an auction. In particular, they for a government to achieve distributional goals in an auction. In particular, they compare the use of targeted subsidies, where some bidders receive a subsidy that compare the use of targeted subsidies, where some bidders receive a subsidy that makes them more competitive, to setting aside certain contracts for those disadvanmakes them more competitive, to setting aside certain contracts for those disadvantaged bidders, as is standard practice in federal procurement and natural resource taged bidders, as is standard practice in federal procurement and natural resource sales. Economic theory does not provide clear guidance on which approach should sales. Economic theory does not provide clear guidance on which approach should be preferred, but their empirical results suggest that relative to setting aside some be preferred, but their empirical results suggest that relative to setting aside some contracts, subsidies increase both revenues and effi ciency. contracts, subsidies increase both revenues and effi ciency.
Many other government agencies use auctions to allocate contracts and Many other government agencies use auctions to allocate contracts and resources. The auctions used by the United States and other countries to sell specresources. The auctions used by the United States and other countries to sell spectrum rights to telecommunications fi rms in the mid-1990s are perhaps the most trum rights to telecommunications fi rms in the mid-1990s are perhaps the most famous among economists. Indeed, these auctions sparked a revival of interest in famous among economists. Indeed, these auctions sparked a revival of interest in auction theory and practice. The involvement of prominent academics in the design auction theory and practice. The involvement of prominent academics in the design of these auctions, and their general success, has helped demonstrate the effectiveof these auctions, and their general success, has helped demonstrate the effectiveness of modern economic theory. Nevertheless, there is little published research on ness of modern economic theory. Nevertheless, there is little published research on how these large and complex auctions actually work. In [19] , Jon, Jeremy Bulow, how these large and complex auctions actually work. In [19] , Jon, Jeremy Bulow, and Paul Milgrom point out that the "activity rules" in these auctions-rules that and Paul Milgrom point out that the "activity rules" in these auctions-rules that govern the eligibility of bidders to continue bidding in subsequent auction rounds as govern the eligibility of bidders to continue bidding in subsequent auction rounds as a function of their earlier bids-create the potential for substantial pricing anomaa function of their earlier bids-create the potential for substantial pricing anomalies. More importantly, they show that aggregate prices appear to be driven by bidder lies. More importantly, they show that aggregate prices appear to be driven by bidder budgets rather than by the bidder valuations emphasized in standard auction theory budgets rather than by the bidder valuations emphasized in standard auction theory papers. This insight stresses the shortcoming of applying standard models to some papers. This insight stresses the shortcoming of applying standard models to some instances of bidding behavior and offers motivation for the study of bidders with instances of bidding behavior and offers motivation for the study of bidders with hard budget constraints. The paper then provides insights into the ways in which hard budget constraints. The paper then provides insights into the ways in which sophisticated bidders can take advantage of pricing anomalies and discusses one sophisticated bidders can take advantage of pricing anomalies and discusses one particular high-stakes case of a spectrum auction where this happened. particular high-stakes case of a spectrum auction where this happened.
Turning to the design of matching markets, two of the best-known examples Turning to the design of matching markets, two of the best-known examples are the market for medical residents and the market for college admissions. Again, are the market for medical residents and the market for college admissions. Again, these are settings where the price mechanism is ruled out, leading the market these are settings where the price mechanism is ruled out, leading the market designer to solicit the preferences of the market participants in order to make effidesigner to solicit the preferences of the market participants in order to make efficient matches. cient matches.
In varying their salary offers across individuals, so that matching takes place with each varying their salary offers across individuals, so that matching takes place with each fi rm offering a fi xed salary. They show that in such a market the equilibrium assignfi rm offering a fi xed salary. They show that in such a market the equilibrium assignment is nearly effi cient but wages are low and signifi cantly compressed, while fi rm ment is nearly effi cient but wages are low and signifi cantly compressed, while fi rm profi ts exceed those in any competitive equilibrium. This result suggests that the profi ts exceed those in any competitive equilibrium. This result suggests that the ability to make discriminatory offers can have a signifi cant impact on the distribuability to make discriminatory offers can have a signifi cant impact on the distribution of surplus in matching markets. tion of surplus in matching markets.
In [16] , Jon and Chris Avery analyze the market for college admissions. They In [16] , Jon and Chris Avery analyze the market for college admissions. They focus on "early admissions," which has become a common feature of this market in focus on "early admissions," which has become a common feature of this market in the last two decades. Many top colleges offer applicants the opportunity to choose the last two decades. Many top colleges offer applicants the opportunity to choose one college to which they apply early, several months before the regular applicaone college to which they apply early, several months before the regular application deadline. The paper combines theory and supporting evidence to explain the tion deadline. The paper combines theory and supporting evidence to explain the importance of early admissions in matching between applicants who are enthusiastic importance of early admissions in matching between applicants who are enthusiastic about certain colleges, and the colleges that wish to admit enthusiastic applicants. about certain colleges, and the colleges that wish to admit enthusiastic applicants. The paper argues that the early admissions policy is a market institution that allows The paper argues that the early admissions policy is a market institution that allows applicants to communicate their enthusiasm about their preferred college in a applicants to communicate their enthusiasm about their preferred college in a credible manner. In particular, the exclusionary nature of the policy generates credible manner. In particular, the exclusionary nature of the policy generates a real opportunity cost, so an applicant who does not apply for early decision to a real opportunity cost, so an applicant who does not apply for early decision to a college signals less enthusiasm about being admitted there. a college signals less enthusiasm about being admitted there.
Finally, Jon's work with Michael Kremer and Chris Snyder [25] offers one more Finally, Jon's work with Michael Kremer and Chris Snyder [25] offers one more illustration of Jon's ability to take insights from economic theory and apply them illustration of Jon's ability to take insights from economic theory and apply them in practice. They analyze the design of Advanced Market Commitments, which in practice. They analyze the design of Advanced Market Commitments, which are targeted subsidy programs to encourage the development and introduction of are targeted subsidy programs to encourage the development and introduction of vaccines and drugs for low-income countries. The basic concept has gained substanvaccines and drugs for low-income countries. The basic concept has gained substantial currency in the development community. Unfortunately, the design that was tial currency in the development community. Unfortunately, the design that was envisioned involves committing to a subsidized price for spot market purchases until envisioned involves committing to a subsidized price for spot market purchases until funds run out, and thus suffers from a serious incentive problem. Unless supply condifunds run out, and thus suffers from a serious incentive problem. Unless supply conditions are competitive, which they typically are not, fi rms have little incentive to invest tions are competitive, which they typically are not, fi rms have little incentive to invest in capacity to serve the full market because selling larger annual quantities does not in capacity to serve the full market because selling larger annual quantities does not increase the overall level of funds in the advanced market commitment program. The increase the overall level of funds in the advanced market commitment program. The paper shows that this problem can be overcome by tying subsidies to long-term supply paper shows that this problem can be overcome by tying subsidies to long-term supply commitments, with contracts allocated through a competitive bidding mechanism. commitments, with contracts allocated through a competitive bidding mechanism.
Markets with Asymmetric Information: Subprime Lending and Health Insurance
In recent years, especially after the economic downturn that started in late In recent years, especially after the economic downturn that started in late 2007, there has been much interest in exploring subprime lending and its conse-2007, there has been much interest in exploring subprime lending and its consequences. In a series of papers with Liran Einav, and former students Will Adams quences. In a series of papers with Liran Einav, and former students Will Adams and Mark Jenkins, Jon examines the organization of subprime automobile-loan and Mark Jenkins, Jon examines the organization of subprime automobile-loan markets. Some good fortune was in play here, perhaps confi rming Louis Pasteur's markets. Some good fortune was in play here, perhaps confi rming Louis Pasteur's "chance favors the prepared mind." This research originated in 2005, a few years "chance favors the prepared mind." This research originated in 2005, a few years before the term "subprime" became a household name-albeit in reference to the before the term "subprime" became a household name-albeit in reference to the market for home mortgages rather than auto loans. market for home mortgages rather than auto loans.
The papers from this project provide a revealing window into low-income, The papers from this project provide a revealing window into low-income, high-risk credit markets. The data, obtained from a large auto sales and fi nancing high-risk credit markets. The data, obtained from a large auto sales and fi nancing company, shows that one-third of loan applicants have no bank account, the modal company, shows that one-third of loan applicants have no bank account, the modal (annual) interest rate is almost 30 percent, and more than 60 percent of the loans (annual) interest rate is almost 30 percent, and more than 60 percent of the loans end in default. The papers seek to understand the high demand for these loans, the end in default. The papers seek to understand the high demand for these loans, the constraints faced by borrowers, and the informational imperfections inherent in constraints faced by borrowers, and the informational imperfections inherent in high-risk consumer lending. The work also develops a range of empirical approaches high-risk consumer lending. The work also develops a range of empirical approaches for studying contracting markets with moral hazard and adverse selection. for studying contracting markets with moral hazard and adverse selection.
In [11] , Jon, Liran, and Will describe several striking facts about subprime In [11] , Jon, Liran, and Will describe several striking facts about subprime lending. First, the individuals in the subprime population appear highly liquidity lending. First, the individuals in the subprime population appear highly liquidity constrained. Loan applicants are extremely sensitive to the required down payment, constrained. Loan applicants are extremely sensitive to the required down payment, far more sensitive than they are to changes in car prices. Moreover, purchasing far more sensitive than they are to changes in car prices. Moreover, purchasing activity spikes dramatically in February and March, when consumers become activity spikes dramatically in February and March, when consumers become eligible for early tax rebates. Indeed, the stark seasonality in demand can be linked eligible for early tax rebates. Indeed, the stark seasonality in demand can be linked to individuals eligible for large rebates under the federal Earned Income Tax to individuals eligible for large rebates under the federal Earned Income Tax Credit program. Second, lenders in this market for high-risk consumer credit face Credit program. Second, lenders in this market for high-risk consumer credit face serious problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Given a choice, high-risk serious problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Given a choice, high-risk borrowers tend to self-select into the largest loans, and default rates for all borrowers borrowers tend to self-select into the largest loans, and default rates for all borrowers are very sensitive to the level of monthly payments. Distinguishing moral hazard are very sensitive to the level of monthly payments. Distinguishing moral hazard from adverse selection is challenging because, as is typical in empirical studies of from adverse selection is challenging because, as is typical in empirical studies of asymmetric information, these two distinct problems give rise to similar empirical asymmetric information, these two distinct problems give rise to similar empirical patterns, which in this context is the positive correlation between default rates and patterns, which in this context is the positive correlation between default rates and loan amounts. Central features of [11] are the use of plausible exogenous variation loan amounts. Central features of [11] are the use of plausible exogenous variation in the loan amount to identify moral hazard separately, and the fi nding that it plays in the loan amount to identify moral hazard separately, and the fi nding that it plays a central role in causing defaults. a central role in causing defaults.
In [21] , Jon, Liran, and Mark develop a more complete model of demand In [21], Jon, Liran, and Mark develop a more complete model of demand that allows for a joint analysis of the demand for cars, the down payment decision, that allows for a joint analysis of the demand for cars, the down payment decision, and the repayment outcomes. The paper then analyzes optimal contract design and the repayment outcomes. The paper then analyzes optimal contract design and quantifi es the value of credit-scoring information and risk-based pricing in such and quantifi es the value of credit-scoring information and risk-based pricing in such a context. This paper is one of the fi rst to incorporate supply-side restrictions in a context. This paper is one of the fi rst to incorporate supply-side restrictions in markets with moral hazard and adverse selection, thus illustrating how standard markets with moral hazard and adverse selection, thus illustrating how standard techniques from industrial organization can be extended to estimate demand techniques from industrial organization can be extended to estimate demand systems for credit or insurance contracts. Although some extrapolation is needed to systems for credit or insurance contracts. Although some extrapolation is needed to leap from automobile loans to home mortgages, many features documented in this leap from automobile loans to home mortgages, many features documented in this paper seem to have played a central role in the recent subprime mortgage market paper seem to have played a central role in the recent subprime mortgage market meltdown, in which lax down payment requirements allowed borrowers to become meltdown, in which lax down payment requirements allowed borrowers to become highly leveraged and therefore vulnerable in the face of declining house prices and highly leveraged and therefore vulnerable in the face of declining house prices and underlying income or liquidity risk. underlying income or liquidity risk.
In [20] , the three authors complement the analysis of the value of risk-based In [20] , the three authors complement the analysis of the value of risk-based fi nancing by using data from before and after the auto loan company switched from fi nancing by using data from before and after the auto loan company switched from a traditional lending model, with signifi cant discretion at the dealership level, to a traditional lending model, with signifi cant discretion at the dealership level, to a modern and highly automated system that used computerized risk models. In a modern and highly automated system that used computerized risk models. In addition to the increase in profi ts through an obvious channel-better information addition to the increase in profi ts through an obvious channel-better information allows more effi cient screening of bad risks-the paper documents a surprisingly allows more effi cient screening of bad risks-the paper documents a surprisingly large increase in profi ts driven by the ability to customize larger and more expenlarge increase in profi ts driven by the ability to customize larger and more expensive cars to better risks, and describes interesting patterns across dealerships within sive cars to better risks, and describes interesting patterns across dealerships within the organization. the organization.
Many of the informational and behavioral problems in credit markets are also Many of the informational and behavioral problems in credit markets are also relevant in insurance markets. In [22] , Jon, Kate Bundorf, and former student relevant in insurance markets. In [22] , Jon, Kate Bundorf, and former student Neale Mahoney study the pricing structure in employer-sponsored health insurance Neale Mahoney study the pricing structure in employer-sponsored health insurance markets. The nature and regulation of employer-provided health insurance leads markets. The nature and regulation of employer-provided health insurance leads to consumers often facing the same prices even though different plans may have a to consumers often facing the same prices even though different plans may have a cost advantage in serving different populations. The paper develops and estimates cost advantage in serving different populations. The paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model of demand and supply for differentiated products to assess an equilibrium model of demand and supply for differentiated products to assess the sorting ineffi ciency caused by this lack of variation in prices. The results suggest the sorting ineffi ciency caused by this lack of variation in prices. The results suggest that plans do indeed have cost structures that favor particular sorting patterns-in that plans do indeed have cost structures that favor particular sorting patterns-in particular, integrated delivery systems, such as Kaiser, seem to have a sizable cost particular, integrated delivery systems, such as Kaiser, seem to have a sizable cost advantage in serving those with poor health status. Yet the amount of sorting inefadvantage in serving those with poor health status. Yet the amount of sorting ineffi ciency caused by uniform pricing is limited, because demand for health insurance fi ciency caused by uniform pricing is limited, because demand for health insurance is relatively inelastic. is relatively inelastic.
Despite the fact that the papers described in this section have been written Despite the fact that the papers described in this section have been written during the more recent part of Jon's career, it is obvious that markets with asymduring the more recent part of Jon's career, it is obvious that markets with asymmetric information have been on his mind for many years. In [4] , which was part metric information have been on his mind for many years. In [4] , which was part of Jon's Ph.D. thesis, he studies the relationship between information and trade in of Jon's Ph.D. thesis, he studies the relationship between information and trade in adverse selection markets. The paper uses a series of examples to show how changes adverse selection markets. The paper uses a series of examples to show how changes in the degree of asymmetric information can have counterintuitive effects on the in the degree of asymmetric information can have counterintuitive effects on the equilibrium quantity of trade. The paper is also related to another early paper in equilibrium quantity of trade. The paper is also related to another early paper in information economics [18] , in which Jon and Susan Athey develop a more general information economics [18] , in which Jon and Susan Athey develop a more general approach to comparing information structures for Bayesian decisions by using approach to comparing information structures for Bayesian decisions by using monotone comparative statics methods to derive notions of informativeness for monotone comparative statics methods to derive notions of informativeness for different kinds of economic decision problems. different kinds of economic decision problems.
Estimation of Dynamic Games
Many problems in industrial organization revolve around industry dynamics: Many problems in industrial organization revolve around industry dynamics: When does market leadership persist? What is the relationship between innovaWhen does market leadership persist? What is the relationship between innovation and market power? How large are sunk costs of entry? What are the trade-offs tion and market power? How large are sunk costs of entry? What are the trade-offs between short-run pricing and long-run investment? These questions are often diffibetween short-run pricing and long-run investment? These questions are often difficult to address using static models of competition, yet the use of dynamic models cult to address using static models of competition, yet the use of dynamic models introduces a host of econometric and computational challenges. One of Jon's most introduces a host of econometric and computational challenges. One of Jon's most cited papers [10] , which is joint with Patrick Bajari and Lanier Benkard, develops cited papers [10] , which is joint with Patrick Bajari and Lanier Benkard, develops a computationally feasible method for estimating dynamic models of imperfect a computationally feasible method for estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition. It has become the standard method that economists (mostly in induscompetition. It has become the standard method that economists (mostly in industrial organization) use for empirical estimation of dynamic games. trial organization) use for empirical estimation of dynamic games.
This approach, which extends earlier infl uential work by Hotz and Miller This approach, which extends earlier infl uential work by Hotz and Miller (1993) on the estimation of dynamic decision problems, is one of several "two-steps (1993) on the estimation of dynamic decision problems, is one of several "two-steps approaches" that were proposed recently in order to ease the computational limitaapproaches" that were proposed recently in order to ease the computational limitations associated with the nested fi xed point approach attributed to Rust (1987) . tions associated with the nested fi xed point approach attributed to Rust (1987) . The basic idea is to fi rst (fl exibly) estimate the Markov decision rule, or "policy The basic idea is to fi rst (fl exibly) estimate the Markov decision rule, or "policy function." The policy function can be used to recover the agent's (expected) value function." The policy function can be used to recover the agent's (expected) value function, which is done through forward simulations. Then, in the second step, one function, which is done through forward simulations. Then, in the second step, one can recover the primitives of each agent's payoff function by choosing the paramcan recover the primitives of each agent's payoff function by choosing the parameters that best rationalize the observed behavior. Jon, Pat, and Lanier suggest doing eters that best rationalize the observed behavior. Jon, Pat, and Lanier suggest doing this by comparing the computed value using the policy function estimated in the this by comparing the computed value using the policy function estimated in the fi rst stage and the value implied by alternative suboptimal policies. The parameters fi rst stage and the value implied by alternative suboptimal policies. The parameters are chosen by minimizing the cases where the alternative is predicted to be better are chosen by minimizing the cases where the alternative is predicted to be better than the actual policy. than the actual policy.
An important advantage of this approach is that it is never necessary to calcuAn important advantage of this approach is that it is never necessary to calculate the equilibrium of the dynamic game, a property that signifi cantly reduces late the equilibrium of the dynamic game, a property that signifi cantly reduces the computational burden. It is both straightforward to implement and also the computational burden. It is both straightforward to implement and also allows users of this approach to apply it for continuous controls (rather than only allows users of this approach to apply it for continuous controls (rather than only discrete controls, as in other approaches). In the three years since its publication, discrete controls, as in other approaches). In the three years since its publication, the method has become the leading approach to estimate dynamic models of the method has become the leading approach to estimate dynamic models of imperfect competition. Its computational ease has made such questions more imperfect competition. Its computational ease has made such questions more feasible to study, and the number of applications that use it is rapidly growing. feasible to study, and the number of applications that use it is rapidly growing. As examples of recent papers that have attracted signifi cant attention, Ryan As examples of recent papers that have attracted signifi cant attention, Ryan (forthcoming) uses this approach to study the dynamic implications of environ-(forthcoming) uses this approach to study the dynamic implications of environmental regulation of cement plants, Holmes (2011) uses it to study the rollout of mental regulation of cement plants, Holmes (2011) uses it to study the rollout of Wal-Mart stores, and Sweeting (2011) uses it to analyze the product positioning Wal-Mart stores, and Sweeting (2011) uses it to analyze the product positioning of radio stations. of radio stations.
Final Remarks
We have tried to summarize Jon's contributions and display the remarkable We have tried to summarize Jon's contributions and display the remarkable depth and breadth of his academic work. We have neglected to mention some depth and breadth of his academic work. We have neglected to mention some exciting work in the pipeline, which is establishing him as a leader of a rapidy exciting work in the pipeline, which is establishing him as a leader of a rapidy growing new area of study: the economics of Internet markets. In [24] data from eBay to investigate seller experimentation on the Internet, the effect data from eBay to investigate seller experimentation on the Internet, the effect of online sales taxes, and the tradeoff between auctions and fi xed prices in selling of online sales taxes, and the tradeoff between auctions and fi xed prices in selling items online. items online.
This new direction refl ects one of the most admirable attributes of Jon's This new direction refl ects one of the most admirable attributes of Jon's approach to research. He works on what interests him and consequently is having approach to research. He works on what interests him and consequently is having fun. Perhaps best captured in Jon's own words: "I think one of the nice things about fun. Perhaps best captured in Jon's own words: "I think one of the nice things about being an academic is, as long as you keep an open mind, interesting questions come being an academic is, as long as you keep an open mind, interesting questions come up and you can start to pursue them and see where they go. That's always been the up and you can start to pursue them and see where they go. That's always been the way that I've done research in the past, and I expect that's how I'll continue to do it way that I've done research in the past, and I expect that's how I'll continue to do it in the future" (Nguyen 2011) . Some of Jon's open-minded views about research can in the future" (Nguyen 2011) . Some of Jon's open-minded views about research can be found in an article about current approaches in the fi eld of industrial organizabe found in an article about current approaches in the fi eld of industrial organization from two years ago in this journal [12] . tion from two years ago in this journal [12] .
Although the Clark Medal is about academic and professional contributions, Although the Clark Medal is about academic and professional contributions, we would be remiss if we did not add a more personal perspective on Jon. We both we would be remiss if we did not add a more personal perspective on Jon. We both have had the pleasure of being Jon's colleagues and coauthors, and we share the have had the pleasure of being Jon's colleagues and coauthors, and we share the honor of being his friends. We stress this friendship because beyond publishing honor of being his friends. We stress this friendship because beyond publishing brilliant and infl uential work, Jon stands out for his personality, which can be brilliant and infl uential work, Jon stands out for his personality, which can be summarized simply as being a real mensch. summarized simply as being a real mensch.
2 2 It is for these reasons that we are It is for these reasons that we are extremely pleased to celebrate Jon's work and achievements. We willingly accept extremely pleased to celebrate Jon's work and achievements. We willingly accept the risk of being perceived as overly adulating, knowing well that if anything, the risk of being perceived as overly adulating, knowing well that if anything, we have failed to truly convey Jon's qualities. Jon's demeanor is always that of we have failed to truly convey Jon's qualities. Jon's demeanor is always that of respect and encouragement, and his genuine interest in others is apparent from respect and encouragement, and his genuine interest in others is apparent from the long list of students that Jon has mentored since starting his career at Stanthe long list of students that Jon has mentored since starting his career at Stanford. Jon always gives more than he takes, and his colleagues benefi t frequently ford. Jon always gives more than he takes, and his colleagues benefi t frequently from his generous professional advice. from his generous professional advice.
Even as a professor, Jon does much more than just work. Sports like tennis, Even as a professor, Jon does much more than just work. Sports like tennis, baseball, and hockey provided balance for Jon in his youth, and he has always been baseball, and hockey provided balance for Jon in his youth, and he has always been an active outdoorsman, pursuing hiking, mountain climbing, and kayaking from a an active outdoorsman, pursuing hiking, mountain climbing, and kayaking from a young age. On one trip in 2002 with a close friend, Jon hiked up Mount Whitney, young age. On one trip in 2002 with a close friend, Jon hiked up Mount Whitney, the tallest peak in the lower 48 states, with a kayak strapped to his back, before the tallest peak in the lower 48 states, with a kayak strapped to his back, before paddling down through the class V headwaters of the Kern River. This would make paddling down through the class V headwaters of the Kern River. This would make any profi cient kayaker more than proud, but as the former President of the Stanany profi cient kayaker more than proud, but as the former President of the Stanford Kayaking Club, it was just another day in the water. ford Kayaking Club, it was just another day in the water.
Jon and his wife Amy, who as a physician has her own demanding schedule, Jon and his wife Amy, who as a physician has her own demanding schedule, are together raising a lovely family of three bright and energetic children: Madeare together raising a lovely family of three bright and energetic children: Madeline, Benjamin, and Noah. The fact that Jon has achieved so much while being line, Benjamin, and Noah. The fact that Jon has achieved so much while being a devoted husband and father is testimony to his productivity and extraordinary a devoted husband and father is testimony to his productivity and extraordinary work habits. Jon's parental responsibilities mean that he must be more cautious, work habits. Jon's parental responsibilities mean that he must be more cautious, and as such, has taken a break from the extreme outdoor activities he used to and as such, has taken a break from the extreme outdoor activities he used to pursue. You are therefore unlikely to see him with a kayak on his back climbing pursue. You are therefore unlikely to see him with a kayak on his back climbing a dangerous trail; his water adventures these days are taking place next to the a dangerous trail; his water adventures these days are taking place next to the toddlers' pool. toddlers' pool.
■ We thank Richard Levin and Jon Levin for very helpful comments and background information.
2 The word "mensch," borrowed widely from Yiddish, informally means a person of integrity and honor; one that has admirable characteristics, such as fortitude and fi rmness of purpose. As Steve Levitt, a former Clark medalist himself, noted on his Freakonomics blog post (2011): "When it comes to Jon Levin I cannot remember anyone saying anything negative about him. (Of course, now that he has the Clark Medal that will likely change in a hurry!)".
